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This paper documents and explains the recent rise of \big-box" general mer-
chandisers. Data from the Census of Retail Trade for 1977{2007 show that
general-merchandise chains grew much faster than specialist retail chains, and
that general merchandisers that added the most stores also made the biggest
increases to their product oerings. We explain these facts with a stylized model
in which a retailer's scale economies interact with consumer gains from one-stop
shopping to generate a complementarity between a retailer's scale and scope.
JEL Codes: L11, L25, L81
Keywords: Retail, chain, big box, superstore, economies of scale, general mer-
chandise, one-stop shopping
Author contact: emek@missouri.edu, shawn.d.klimek@census.gov, or van pham@baylor.edu. Any opin-
ions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views
of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no condential information is
disclosed. We thank the coeditor, an anonymous referee, Saku Aura, Jonathan Beck, Roger Betancourt,
Tom Davido, Lucia Foster, David Gautschi, John Haltiwanger, Tom Holmes, Tom Hubbard, Bob Hunt,
Ron Jarmin, Ren ata Kosov a, Julia Lane, Michael Lynch, David Mandy, Guy Michaels, Tom Mroz, Leonard
Nakamura, Kevin Tsui, Henry Wan, and seminar participants at Berkeley (Haas), Census Bureau, Clemson,
Delaware, Department of Justice, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Federal Trade Commission, George
Washington University, IUPUI, London Business School, Missouri, Maryland, Washington University in St.
Louis, the 2006 \Advances in the Empirical Analysis of Retailing" workshop at WZ-Berlin, the 2007 AEA
(Chicago), the 2007 IIOC (Savannah), the 2008 RPI Mini-Conference on Marketing and Innovation and the
2010 Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Data (London) for comments. Basker also thanks the University of
Missouri Economic and Policy Analysis Research Center (EPARC) and the University of Missouri Research
Board for nancial support.1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by two observations: the growth of retail chains, and the increased
diversity of products sold in many chains. Examples of the latter include groceries sold at
gas stations and drugstores, coee shops incorporated into many bookstores, combination
tness centers/spas, and the addition of banks and pharmacies in many supermarkets. An-
other example is the Canadian bookstore chain Indio, which sells owers and wine, among
other oerings. We nd that stores in the general-merchandise subsector, which includes
chains that sell a wide breadth of products, are not only larger than stores in other re-
tail subsectors by every available measure, they are also growing much faster. Moreover,
general-merchandise chains operate more stores than other chains, and are growing fast in
this dimension as well. These trends are complementary: the same rms that are growing
in one dimension are also growing in the other. Using rm-level records spanning thirty
years for the general-merchandise subsector from the Census of Retail Trade, we document
a strong and persistent relationship between a rm's scale and a newly developed measure
of scope in a dierence-in-dierence specication.
The fact that these trends are strongest among general merchandisers suggests an expla-
nation that relies in part on a \one-stop-shopping" eect. Consumers' desire to consolidate
shopping trips is a motivator for product-line expansion outside general merchandising as
well, but it is likely to be strongest in a subsector that already, by denition, sells a wide va-
riety of products. What we have in mind for product proliferation is not the phenomenon of
increased varieties within a narrow product category, such as more sizes, avors, and brands
of breakfast cereals, which Betancourt and Gautschi (1990) call product depth. Our focus,
instead, is on increased product breadth, the introduction of completely new and seemingly
unrelated product classes into a single store. Whereas increased product depth provides
more opportunities for substitution across products sold by the same store, greater product
breadth increases the total number of products a consumer buys in the store and reduces
both the number of shopping trips she makes and her corresponding transportation cost.Our empirical work uses micro data collected at the store level from the quinquennial
Economic Census, starting with 1977 data and continuing through 2007. The data allow us
to track general-merchandise retailers over time and follow their expansion into new product
markets as well as new geographic markets, through the addition of stores. The data are
uniquely suited to study the expansion of product breadth because the forms require retailers
to provide information on their sales receipts from each of approximately 40 broad product
categories, including groceries, women's apparel, hardware, and optical goods. We nd that
rms' expansion on the two margins | number of stores and number of product lines |
are complements. Evaluating our point estimates for the average chain, adding two stores
(a 10% increase in the number of stores) is associated with an addition of roughly 100 items
to each store in the chain.
To explain our empirical observations, we build a simple model of a retail rm simul-
taneously choosing its scale (the number of stores it operates) and scope (the number of
distinct product lines it carries), in which the rm's two margins for expansion are strategic
complements. Technological innovations such as bar codes and electronic data interchanges
have facilitated automated purchasing from suppliers and reduced the cost of inventory
management, allowing chains to take advantage of economies of scale in purchasing without
undue logistical costs. We argue that because of the interaction of economies of scale on
the cost side with a demand for one-stop shopping, any innovation that directly increases
the number of stores a general-merchandise chain operates also induces the chain to expand
the range of products it sells. On the cost side, as a chain adds stores | increasing sales
volume | economies of scale cause the marginal cost of the product to fall. Lower marginal
cost induces the chain to increase its range of product oerings, drawing in more customers
who take advantage of its \one-stop" oering. The combination of more products and more
customers at each store increases store prot, prompting the retail chain to add even more
stores.
To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to consider the interaction between scale and
2scope in the retail sector. Existing work on chains mostly focuses on the spatial aspects
of a chain's location decisions and abstracts from the chain's choice of product selection.
Holmes (2011), for example, models the spatial expansion of Wal-Mart in the presence of
\economies of density." Work on large or multi-product retail stores, in contrast, tends
to treat stores as independent entities. Recent papers include Holmes (2001), who argues
that improvements in inventory-management technology such as bar-code scanners have led
retailers to expand product breadth. Marvel and Peck (2008), in contrast, show that under
some conditions these same technology improvements can have the opposite eect, reducing
product depth for many retailers. Ellickson (2007), who focuses on the supermarket business,
treats expanding variety as an investment in quality that is an endogenous xed cost which
creates natural oligopolies. An important exception is Betancourt (2005, pp. 173-180), who
explicitly models a chain's choice of scope and notes the symmetries between scope and scale,
but does not discuss the complementarities between them. By formulating the retail chain's
problem as a simultaneous choice of scale and scope, we can analyze both the direct eect
of technology on scale and scope and the interaction between scale and scope, and bring
together previously disconnected strands of the literature on the eects of chain stores.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
general-merchandise subsector and presents the aggregate stylized facts motivating our model.
Section 3 describes the Census micro data and shows the relationship within general mer-
chandising between chain growth and product-line growth. We lay out our theoretical model
of chain retailing and competition and derive conditions for complementarity of a dominant
retailer's store size (scope) and its chain size (scale) in Section 4, and oer some extensions
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results.
32 Background and Aggregate Stylized Facts
General merchandisers have become increasingly important in retail, accounting for nearly
15% of all retail revenues in 2007, including 75% of children's wear, 72% of toys and
hobby goods, 51% of paper products, and 49% of small electrical appliances.1 A general-
merchandise store is also more likely than a store outside of general merchandising to belong
to a chain. Table 1 provides a snapshot of the dierences between the retail sector as a
whole and the general-merchandise subsector from the 2007 Census of Retail Trade (CRT).2
General-merchandise retailers constitute only 1.2% of all retail rms, but account for 4.1%
of retail stores and more than three times as much in terms of revenue. In 2007, 81% of
general-merchandise stores belonged to chains but only 39% of stores outside general mer-
chandising belonged to chains; the corresponding gures for chains with at least 100 stores
were 77% and 24%.
In this section, we establish three stylized facts using the aggregate data. First, the retail
sector as a whole has become more concentrated over time. Second, this trend is particularly
striking among general merchandisers. Third, stores have also grown over time, increasing
their square footage, employment, sales, and product breadth; this has been particularly
true for general-merchandise stores. We discuss each of these facts in turn.
First, the retail sector as a whole has become much more concentrated over time, with
retail chains accounting for a growing share of consumer dollars. Figure 1(a) documents the
rising share of retail revenues accounted for by retail chains. Until the late 1970s, more than
1The North American Industrial Classication System (NAICS), currently used by the Census, denes
\General Merchandise Stores" (NAICS 452) as stores that sell \new general merchandise [to retail consumers]
from xed point-of-sale locations. Establishments in this subsector are unique in that they have the equip-
ment and sta capable of retailing a large variety of goods from a single location" (Oce of Management
and Budget, 1998, p. 445). Before the classication change that took place in 1997, the Census used the
Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) system, which dened the subsector (SIC 53) as consisting of \stores
which sell a number of lines of merchandise, such as dry goods, apparel and accessories, furniture and home
furnishings, small wares, hardware, and food" (Oce of Management and Budget, 1987, p. 317).
2Unless otherwise specied, all gures and tables in this section were created from published CRT tables
and not directly from the rm-level data we use later in this paper. We rely on published Census of Retail
Trade gures whenever possible to comply with Census Bureau policy.
4half of all consumer dollars were spent at single-store retailers; today, more than 60% of
consumer dollars are spent at chain stores, double the share of 1954. The revenue share of
large chains, with 100 or more stores, more than tripled over the same period. Along similar
lines, Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2009) show, using data from the Census Bureau's
Longitudinal Business Database, that chains' share of the total retail store count and their
share of total retail employment has been increasing for several decades.3
Empirical studies of the competitive eects of large general-merchandise chains such as
Wal-Mart and Kmart have focused on easy-to-measure outcomes. Several studies analyze
store closings in the immediate vicinity of the new superstores. Basker (2005) estimates
that each new Wal-Mart store accounts for, on average, a net reduction of 4.7 stores with
fewer than 100 employees. Over the course of the thirty years from 1977 to 2007, Wal-Mart
opened approximately 3,000 new stores (Basker and Noel, 2009), which, by this estimate,
have caused the closure of over 12,000 competing stores. On a similar scale, Jia (2008) nds
that Wal-Mart's expansion between 1987 and 1997 explains approximately half of the decline
in single-store general merchandisers in the U.S. over this time period, and 30{40% of the
decline of smaller general-merchandise chains. All told, Census of Retail Trade gures show
a net decrease of about 400,000, or 30%, in the number of retail establishments (excluding
restaurants) with fewer than 100 employees between 1977 and 2007.
The second stylized fact to emerge from the aggregate data is that general-merchandise
chains have been growing much faster than specialist chains.4 In terms of chain dominance,
the retail sector today looks like the general-merchandise subsector more than half a century
ago. Figure 1(b) shows the share of dollars spent at chains and at large chains in the general-
merchandise subsector. Chains now account for virtually all general-merchandise sales: 99%
of all general-merchandise dollars are spent at chains, and 97% at large chains, again dened
3For a historical perspective on the diculties of building up a general-merchandise retail chain, see
Chandler (1969); Ra and Temin (1999).
4We use the term \specialists" to include any subsector in retail other than general merchandisers and
non-store retailers such as catalog companies, retail web sites, and vending machine operators.
5as chains with 100 or more stores, up from 34% fty years ago. Figure 2(a) shows the average
number of stores operated by general-merchandiser rms and all other retailers. Between
1963 and 2007 the average number of stores in a general-merchandise retailer more than
tripled, rising from 1.43 to 5.15; average chain size also increased in the rest of the retail
sector, but only modestly, from 1.12 to 1.56.5
As Table 2 documents, over the course of the thirty years from 1977 to 2007, the number
of single-store general merchandisers has fallen by more than 40% and the number of small
chains by over 75% while the number of large chains has decreased by 20%. This consolidation
is not a symptom of a shrinking subsector: revenues in real terms have increased by 80%.
CRT data show that in 2007, the top four general-merchandise chains alone accounted for
more than 10% of all retail revenue, more than double their share thirty years earlier.
The aggregate data also show our third stylized fact: the average retail store has grown,
and the average general-merchandise store has grown even more. This is true across a num-
ber of measures of store size: employment, revenue, product selection, and square footage.
Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2009) document the growth in store-level employment using
data from 1958 to 2000. On average, employment per store has more than doubled, from six
to 14, over this time period; the biggest increases have occurred at national chains. Although
part of the explanation for this trend could be that stores are open longer hours, Jarmin,
Klimek, and Miranda (2009) also show that, at the county level, the average number of stores
per capita has been decreasing, consistent with increased consolidation rather than just an
increase in hours of operation.
Revenues, another measure of store size, have also been increasing throughout the retail
sector, but most noticeably at general-merchandise stores. Figure 2(b) shows the trends in
revenue per store in general merchandising, food stores, and the rest of retail from 1954
5We exclude eating and drinking establishments and non-store retailers from the \rest of retail." Eating
and drinking establishments were classied as retail establishments under the SIC, but are no longer included
as retailers in NAICS.
6to 2007, in millions of 2007 dollars (CPI deated). While revenue per store in other retail
subsectors have increased by 1.3 log points, nearly quadrupling, in real terms over this period,
general-merchandisers' revenue per store, already twice as high than other retailers' in 1954,
have increased by nearly two log points (six-fold) over the same time period, increasing from
$2m in 1954 to $12.6m in 2007.
Among general merchandisers, there is also evidence of square-footage growth and
growth in product breadth. The most obvious measure of size is store square footage. In
1977, 53.7% of general-merchandise stores had total oor space exceeding 50,000 square feet;
by 2007, that fraction was up to 61.5% of general-merchandise stores.6 Larger stores carry
more distinct product lines: stores larger than 50,000 square feet carry 25{70% more distinct
product lines than smaller stores. Using Census data to track product selection over time
is harder, because changes in Census forms and in the denition of product lines aect the
observed probability that a store sells any given product. For this reason, when we turn to
the micro data in the next section, we control for changes in forms over time. However, there
is both systematic and anecdotal evidence that the number of products carried by general
merchandisers has increased over time. Figure 3 shows the fraction of general-merchandise
stores selling selected lines in 1977, 1992, and 2007. The share of general-merchandise stores
selling groceries increased from 64% to 88% between 1977 and 2007, and the share selling
furniture increased from 42% to 55%. Anecdotally, moreover, many general merchandisers
have added groceries to their product oerings; since the late 1980s, Wal-Mart, Target, and
Kmart have all added \superstore" formats that include full grocery stores (Basker and Noel,
2009).
From the above discussion, we distill the following: that general-merchandise chains,
which by denition sell a wide variety of products, tend to be larger, and have been growing
faster, than other retail chains, and that stores, in particular within general merchandise,
6These numbers are calculated from micro data les, using weights to account for sampling. We do not
have reliable micro data on square footage outside general merchandising.
7have been growing. To see whether these trends | the growth of retail chains and the rise of
the \big-box" retail format | are occurring in the same chains, we turn in the next section
to Census of Retail Trade micro data. Using data on product sales and the number of stores
for general-merchandise rms in the United States over a 30-year period, we show that there
is a systematic relationship between growth in rm size and growth in the number of distinct
product categories sold by the rm.
3 Empirical Analysis of Census Micro Data
3.1 Census Micro Data
In this section, we use micro data from the Census of Retail Trade (CRT) for the years
1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007.7 Detailed Economic Census forms, from
which our data are compiled, are mailed to every chain store, as well as to a sample of
single-store retailers. Data on stores that do not receive or do not return forms comes from
administrative records. To comply with Census Bureau condentiality restrictions we cannot
report any information that can be linked to any specic rm, nor can we provide a list of
rms included in the analysis.
The unit of observation in the CRT is the establishment, or store. We limit our analysis
to stores in general merchandising, SIC 53 (or NAICS 452) that received Census forms
numbered RT-5301 or RT-5302 (in 1982{1997) or RT-45201 or RT-45202 (in 2002 and 2007).8
We are able to aggregate store-level information to the rm level by using rm identiers for
each store. Firm identiers allow us to track ownership over time, so we know the size, or
scale, of each chain (number of stores it operates).
A second major piece of information we obtain from the CRT is the number of distinct
product lines sold by each store. Each form includes a list of possible product lines, such as
7See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) for more details on the CRT.
8We do not restrict observations by form in 1977 because form information is not available for that year.
8\toys, hobby goods, and games" and \major household appliances." There are two types of
product lines: broad lines and detailed lines, which provide a partial breakdown of the
broad lines. Table B-1 in the Appendix lists the broad categories of goods, along with the
years they are included on the forms and the number of detailed lines associated with each.9
The broad line \groceries," for example, includes up to nine detailed lines: meat, sh, and
poultry; fresh and prepackaged produce; frozen foods; dairy products; bakery products; deli
items; soft drinks; candy; and all other foods. This level of detail is available only for 2002
and 2007, however, and only for stores receiving form RT-45202; all other forms include the
broad line \groceries" without the detailed breakdown. We drop from our dataset a small
number of stores that report selling just one product line on the grounds that they are either
misreporting or incorrectly classied as general merchandisers.
Taking a simple count of the number of lines over time is problematic, because the
number of lines listed on the general-merchandising forms changes over time as well as across
the two forms at a point in time. We take several steps to adjust for increases over time in
the number of lines listed on the Census forms. To minimize the increase in reported product
lines, we created a longitudinally consistent concordance of product lines. In addition, we
control for yearfraction of establishments in each rm receiving each form in our regression
analysis to capture any changes in the forms over time.
In most cases, rms report product-line revenues for all their stores. However, we do
control for a rm's coverage: the share of its stores reporting lines data. More than 95% of
retailers in our dataset have coverage of 1, and more than 99% have coverage above 0:5 (we
omit retailers that do not report lines data for any of their stores from this calculation). An
implicit assumption is that the reporting stores are representative of the chain as a whole.
We impute lines only in a few special circumstances. First, if a store reports sales of a broad
9Product data have never been used before in a micro-data study of the retail sector. Basker and
Van (2010) use aggregate information on product-line revenues by dierent retail subsectors. Product-level
information has been used in many studies of manufacturing rms; see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
(2008), for example. Yeap (2011) uses product-level information in a study of the service industry.
9product category but does not indicate which detailed line(s) it sells, we add one to its count
of detailed lines. We also add a detailed line to the count if the revenue shares of all detailed
lines within a broad category sum to less than 98% of the revenue share reported for the
broad line. We add a broad line if a store reports selling a detailed product line but not its
parent broad line. Finally, if a store reports selling one or more product lines that do not
appear on the form it received (\write ins") we add one detailed line and one broad line to
its count of lines.
The count of lines sold at the rm level is an upper bound on the actual number of lines
sold. Some lines may be experimental, appearing in a small fraction of stores and generating
little revenue, or they may be reported in error by one or two stores in a chain. This type of
\line ination" is a particular concern for the current analysis because it is likely to be more
pronounced for larger chains, where more stores mean more forms with the opportunity for
error. To overcome this problem we calculate a weighted average of lines, weighted by the
fraction of stores in the chain selling that line. This number is identical to the total number
of lines sold for single-store retailers and for retailers selling the same lines in each store, but
it falls below the total number of lines for chains selling either a dierent number of lines or
a dierent composition of lines across stores.
Finally, as a robustness check, we also calculate the \eective" number of lines sold by









where n is the total number of lines sold by the retailer, and revenuei is the revenue the rm
receives from sales of product i. The inverse Herndahl takes on values in (1;n]. The upper
bound is obtained only in the case of equal revenue shares across all products. The more
10sales are dominated by a single product, the closer is the inverse Herndahl to one.10
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the data used in the regressions. The data set
represents a snapshot of the general-merchandise subsector in each of the seven census years.
Of the nearly 17,500 observations in our data, representing nearly 13,000 retailers, more
than 14,000 are single-store retailer-years, and almost 3,000 retailer-years are small chains,
averaging 8.9 stores per chain. Only 235 observations come from chains with 100 or more
stores, but these chains have 628 stores on average. Both the number of broad lines and the
number of detailed lines increase with chain size. As expected, the total number of products
sold is larger than the average number of products across stores in the rm, except in the
case of single-store retailers, where they are identical. Also as expected, the average number
of lines sold is less sensitive to chain size than the total number of lines sold.
Due to entry, exit, and consolidations, our data comprise an unbalanced panel: some
rms show up only once, while others appear in all seven census years. The last column
in Table 3 provides the share of rms (by size class) that are dynamic, that is, for which
we have more than one observation in the data. We include this information to clarify
which observations are contributing to the identication of the parameter of interest in the
regression analysis in the next section. Virtually all dynamic rms exhibit changes in the
number of stores and the number of lines over the study period and therefore contribute
to the estimation of the relationship between rm scale and scope in our regressions, which
always include rm xed eects. Almost all large chains (93%) are dynamic, as are 73% of
small chains and 38% of single-store retailers. The second panel of Table 3 provides a closer
10Many combinations of revenue shares produce the same Herndahl value. For example, consider rms
selling 6.4 eective broad lines (the average number for dynamic rms in our dataset). All of them must sell
at least seven products in total, but depending on the distribution of revenue shares, the total number of
products could vary considerably. A rm selling seven products, one with revenue share of 25%, and each
of the remaining six with revenue share of 12.5%, has 6.4 eective product lines; so does a rm selling 14
products, one with revenue share of 35% and each of the remaining 13 with revenue share of 5%. The inverse
Herndahl may, hypothetically, even fall when a new line is introduced by a retailer, if the new line turns
out to dominate sales. In practice, the number of eective lines is highly and positively correlated with the
total, and average, number of lines sold by the retailer.
11look at the dynamic subsample of the data. This sample contains about 7,700 observations
from 3,000 rms, which are, on average, larger than the rms in the full sample and carry
more lines.
The total number of observations in Table 3 is smaller than the one reported in Table 2 for
two reasons. First, as noted above, we omit rms that did not get the general-merchandise
forms from our data set. Second, we exclude retailers for which no store reported any
product line sales. This is much more likely to happen for single-store retailers, of which we
use approximately 20%. In contrast, virtually all the large-chain observations from the CRT
are included in our data.
3.2 The Relationship between Store Growth and Line Growth
We start with a simple descriptive analysis, testing for a correlation between a retailer's log
number of stores and the log of the number of product lines it carries: (ln(stores);ln(lines)).
The correlations are all positive and statistically signicant at the 0.01% level, and range
from 0.20 (for both the average and \eective" number of broad lines) to 0.31 (for the
total number of detailed lines). We repeat the same exercise for log changes, calculating
(ln(stores);ln(lines)). Again, we nd very signicant, albeit smaller, correlations be-
tween the change in the log number of stores and the change in the log number of product
lines carried, with correlation coecients ranging from 0.05 (for the average number of de-
tailed lines) to 0.12 (for the total number of both broad and detailed lines).
Next, we compare the probability of an increase in the number of product lines with
and without a concurrent increase in the number of stores. To do this, we separate retailers
into those whose store count grew and those whose store count stagnated or decreased since
the previous census year. Let 1(storesrt > 0) be an indicator for retailer r's store count
increasing between year (t   5) and year t, and dene 1(linesrt > 0) similarly, for the
number of lines. Forty-three percent of continuing rms that did not add stores increased
their line count, compared to 51% of stores that did add stores. This dierence is statistically
12signicant at the 1% level. For detailed lines, the dierence is smaller (0.52 vs. 0.57) but
still statistically signicant at the 5% level.
We use a dierence-in-dierence specication to put the analysis into a regression frame-
work. This allows us to estimate the magnitude of the relationship between stores and lines
while controlling for unobserved dierences across rms and changes over time in Census
forms and product line denitions and to isolate the within-rm relationship between num-
ber of products sold and number of stores operated. We estimate
ln(linesrt) = r +
X
f
(t  rft) +   ln(storesrt) +   coveragert + "rt (1)
where linesrt is the number of lines of merchandise sold by retailer r in year t, r is a retailer
xed eect for each of the 12,787 retailers in the sample, t is a year xed eect for each
of the seven census years, rft the fraction of stores belonging to retailer r that received
form f in year t (for forms RT-5301, RT-5302, RT-45201, and RT-45202), and storesrt
is the number of stores operated by retailer r in year t. The retailer xed eects ensure
that we identify the relationship between stores and lines using only within-rm variation
over time; only dynamic rms contribute to the parameter identication. This means that
although the regression is in levels, we can interpret  as the relationship between changes
in ln(stores) and changes in ln(lines). We include yearform controls because, as noted
earlier, dierent forms contain dierent counts of detailed and broad lines, and these change
over time. The control variable coverage is the fraction of a retailer's stores for which
valid line counts are obtained. The error term "rt is clustered at the rm level to allow for
arbitrary autocorrelation.
Table 4 reports our estimates of the coecient  for the full sample. Each column
represents a dierent measure of product lines. Results using our preferred measure of
product lines, the average number of lines sold across stores in the chain, are presented in
the rst two columns: rst broad lines, then detailed lines. The elasticity estimates in both
13cases are near 0.07. In other words, a 10% increase in the number of stores is associated
with a 0.7% increase in the number of product lines.
Recall that the average dynamic rm in our data in Table 3 has 22 stores, so a 10%
increase in its store count amounts to two new stores. Applying the average line counts for
dynamic rms, our estimates imply that this two-store increase is associated with, respec-
tively, a 0.1 increase in the average number of broad lines and a 0.15 increase in the average
number of detailed lines sold by stores in the chain.
How many items does a tenth of a broad product line represent? Census data do not
break down detailed lines into stock-keeping units (SKUs), but we have some sense of this
from outside sources. A typical Wal-Mart store, for example, sells as many as 1,400 book
titles (Heher, 2009) and 1,800 dierent toys (Reuters, 2002).11 A Target store is said to
carry between 600 and 1,500 music SKUs (Christman, 2002). Other product categories may
be signicantly smaller (e.g., large appliances) or larger: the number of grocery products
in a typical \Supercenter" is well above 10,000. Assuming, for convenience, that a typical
product category has 1,000 products, each 0.1 increase in a broad product line amounts to
selling 100 additional items. Two new stores in a chain of 22, then, are associated with an
average increase of approximately 100 items per store in the chain.
The next set of estimates allows us to determine whether this increase reects the same
100 or so products being added at all stores in the chain, or 100 dierent products in each
store. In the rst case, the total number of lines sold by the chain would increase to the same
degree as the average; in the second case, it would increase twenty times as much. Replacing
the average number of lines sold per store with the total number of lines sold chain-wide as
the left-hand side variable does increase the point estimates, but by a factor just shy of two.
Part of this increase may be due to measurement error in the total line count, which, as
11Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2009) visited two Wal-Mart stores and two Target stores and counted
the number of book titles each oered. They found about 850 titles in the Wal-Mart stores and about 1,300
titles in the Target stores.
14noted earlier, is exacerbated by the size of the chain. Although it is impossible to say with
certainty how much of the increase in the coecient estimates is due to this bias and how
much to product diversication across stores in the chain, the results suggest that most, if
not all, of the increase represents the same product lines being added to all stores in the
chain.
The last two columns use the \eective" number of product lines sold by the chain,
calculated as the inverse Herndahl index. The fact that the inverse Herndahl increases as
much as, or more than, the average line count indicates that the new products reduce the
revenue share of dominant products and level the revenue distribution across products.
In addition to estimating Equation (1) on the full set of general-merchandise rms,
we have also estimated it separately on subsets of rms by size. Given the dominance of
single-store retailers and small chains in the rm population, it is not too surprising that
we nd very similar estimates when we restrict the sample to small chains. The estimates
for large chains, which we show in Table 5, are somewhat larger. For the average number of
product lines, the coecients for the large-chain sample are approximately 50% larger than
for the full sample. The average large dynamic chain has 660 stores and carries an average
of 21 broad product lines in each store (or 28 broad lines throughout the chain). For this
chain adding 66 stores, which increases the number of stores by 10%, is associated with an
increase of about 1.3% in the average number of broad lines, or more than a quarter of a
broad line, carried by the chain. This amounts to an increase of about 270 individual items
per store. The coecient estimates with total lines and the inverse Herndahl as left-hand
side variables are extremely similar to the results using average line counts, again consistent
with the same lines being added across stores in the chain and with a leveling of the revenue
distribution.
The economic repercussions of even a small increase in the number of product lines
carried by a general-merchandise chain can be quite large. In the famous case of Wal-Mart's
addition of a full line of groceries to its \Supercenters," Wal-Mart has nearly tripled its store
15count over a twenty-year period while adding grocery lines to most, but not yet all, its stores
(Basker and Noel, 2009), and continuing to add other lines, such as pharmacies, a process
started even earlier. This process has been slow, consistent with our coecient estimates, but
has had far-reaching eects on consumers' access to groceries, on prices, selection, and quality
industry-wide. Incumbent supermarkets have reduced their prices by 1{2% on average when
a new Wal-Mart Supercenter opens in their city (Basker and Noel, 2009) and reduced their
stockouts by up to 24% compared to pre-entry levels (Matsa, forthcoming).
As general merchandisers expand into an increasing number of product lines, subsector
after subsector realigns to adjust to the new competitive environment. In the book market,
Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2009) nd that Wal-Mart and Target entry increase relative
demand at Amazon.com, and by implication at local bookstores as well, for obscure titles
over best sellers. Inventory costs are likely to rise if bookstores sell fewer best sellers, and
lower demand reduces revenue. Both eects reduce the protability of incumbent bookstores.
In the next subsection, we explore the role that mergers and acquisitions play in the
growth of both stores and lines. Following that, we take a detailed look at the extent to
which rms are adding lines in new versus in existing stores.
3.3 Mergers and Acquisitions
Anecdotally, the largest general-merchandise chains have grown both by building new stores
and by acquiring stores, and sometimes entire chains. Examples of the latter range from
Wal-Mart's purchase of 92 Kuhn's-Big K stores in 1981, which increased Wal-Mart's store
count by more than 25% overnight (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1982), to the 2005 mega-merger
of Sears and Kmart that created the third-largest retailer in the United States (Irwin, 2005).
We test whether mergers and acquisitions (M&A) represent a special opportunity to
increase product lines, even after controlling for the number of stores in the chain, by adding
a M&A indicator to the regression from Equation (1). We construct this indicator by
16observing whether any store belonging to retailer r in year t belonged to a dierent retailer
in the previous census year.
The results are shown in Table 6. We nd that the eect of a merger or acquisition on
the average number of lines sold by stores in the chain is as large as the eect of doubling the
chain size. Whereas the total number of lines increases by more than the average number of
product lines in conjunction with a given increase in store count, the eect of a merger on
the two outcomes is quite similar, consistent with adding the same lines to all stores in the
chain. The eect of a merger on the inverse Herndahl measure of lines is smaller and less
precisely measured. This last eect is consistent with the ambiguous relationship between
the inverse Herndahl and the number of product lines.
3.4 New Stores
The number of product lines in a growing chain can increase because new stores have more
products lines than existing stores, because the number of product lines in existing stores
increases, or because of a combination of these. To investigate the relative importance of
new stores in increasing chains' product breadth, we decompose increases in the number of
product lines into the share due to increases in product lines in continuing stores and the
dierence between new stores' product lines and the average number of product lines sold
by the chain in the previous census year.
Formally, let linesrt be the number of product lines sold by retailer r in year t, averaged
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where the weights, wnew
rt and wcont
rt represent the relative counts of new and continuing stores,
respectively, in year t. We restrict this analysis to the case where the average number of lines
is non-decreasing, for the chain as a whole as well as for its new and continuing components,
to ensure that our weights sum to one.
We can identify three sorts of \new" stores in the chain. First are stores that are
newly constructed, or \new-new" stores. Second are stores that were added to the chain
in a merger or acquisition, as discussed in the previous section, or \merged-new" stores.
Third are stores that moved a short distance or underwent a major renovation, or \new-and-
improved" stores. We have already described how we identify the rst two types in previous
sections. For the third type, new-and-improved stores, we rely on store-level reports of
square footage on Census forms. Approximately two-thirds of general-merchandise stores in
our data report total under-roof square footage. When we have reports for two consecutive
years, we interpret a 10% or larger change in total square footage as a major renovation or
address change.12
We nd that new-new stores contribute 31% of the growth in product lines at the re-
tailer level. This value is invariant to the use of broad or detailed product lines. Merged-new
stores make a negligible contribution despite the fact that, as found in the previous subsec-
tion, mergers themselves are correlated with relatively large increases in line counts. New-
and-improved stores contribute 15% of broad-line growth and 18% of detailed-line growth.
Continuing stores in continuous ownership and with no observed changes in square footage
12In principle, we could use address information to determine moves, but in practice this is not feasible
due to the very large number of variations for individual addresses, ranging from abbreviations, including or
excluding unit numbers in malls, spelling variations, etc.
18contribute approximately 50% of the total.
What this means is that, as a general-merchandise retailer grows, it not only increases
the product lines it sells in its new stores, but also in its existing stores. This, combined with
the preceding regression analysis, suggests the presence of some economies of scope in selling
individual product lines. When a retailer adds a product line, it adds the line throughout
the chain, although in some cases this process may take years to complete.
The next section presents a model of a chain retailer motivated by the above empirical
analysis. In equilibrium, the chain retailer's choice of the number of products to sell and
the number of stores to operate turn out to be strategic complements, and any increase in
parameter values | for example cost or technology parameters | leads the chain to increase
its scale and scope together.
4 Model
4.1 Environment
There is a large set of non-overlapping ex-ante identical locations. In each location, a con-
tinuum of consumers has unit demand for each of N product categories, or lines, such as
apparel, toys, or hardware. Our goal is to capture the sorts of product categories we have
in the Retail Census data set, and the fact that a shopper at a general-merchandise store is
likely to buy a basket of products | perhaps a pair of shoes, a toy, a microwave oven, and
a book | unlike a shopper at a shoe store.
There are two types of stores: mom-and-pop specialist stores, each of which sells one
line in a single location; and a chain superstore selling multiple lines at multiple locations.13
Every trip to a store entails a transportation cost, which includes both the time cost and
13The assumption that specialist stores do not belong to chains is consistent with the evidence in Fig-
ure 2(a) that the average number of stores operated by a specialist retailer is well below two. We discuss
specialist chains in an extension in Section 5.2.
19the physical transportation cost required to go to one more store. The superstore provides
an opportunity for one-stop shopping by combining several shopping trips into one. In
this paper we interpret the \transportation cost" very broadly to include any transaction
cost, such as standing in line and digging for change, that needs to be repeated at every
stop.14 Although we have general-merchandise stores in mind when we think about one-stop
shopping, the same eect may exist to a lesser extent in other subsectors, chiey groceries.
In addition to a transportation cost, a consumer who shops at the superstore incurs an
\aversion" cost representing her distaste for the \big-box" shopping environment. Consumers
vary in their aversion to big-box shopping. The cost, , is distributed according to the
exponential probability density function
f() = exp( ):
A mom-and-pop store selling product i has constant marginal cost ci













 is the home-oce cost of coordination, management, logistics and distribution
for a chain selling n product lines in k stores, with a technology parameterized by ; and
w() is the variable cost of selling a given volume of a single line. The assumption that the
chain sells the same n products in each of its k stores is justied by the fact that the total
number of product lines sold by a chain in the Census micro data does not diverge by much
from the average number of product lines sold across stores in the chain (see Table 3).
14Betancourt and Gautschi (1988, 1990) rigorously model the implications of transportation costs and
other distribution services for the household's production function, but they consider only a one-store re-
tailer. We complement that analysis by endogenizing the size of the chain along with the retailer' product
selection (a form of distribution services considered an \implicit good" by Betancourt and Gautschi) and
prices. Klemperer and Padilla (1997) discuss the related idea of consumers' \shopping costs" giving rise
to a consumer's preference to use one supplier. However, there, the shopping cost comes from establishing
new relationships, uncertainty, learning about new suppliers, and feelings of loyalty, which makes it closer
in spirit to the idea of a \switching cost" rather than the transportation cost in our model.
20The variable cost w() is positive, increasing, and concave, with w0(0) < ci
m for all i.
One reason for a decreasing marginal cost is that larger retailers may be able to lower costs
by engaging in direct negotiation with alternative suppliers, especially ones located in more
remote areas (e.g., in less developed countries); this idea is explored by Basker and Van (2008,
2010) and Caprice and von Schlippenbach (2008). In addition, increased concentration in the
retail sector may decrease suppliers' outside options, so that in a bargaining situation they
may be forced to accept a lower price (Inderst and Wey, 2007; Caprice and von Schlippenbach,
2008).
The coordination cost d(;) includes what Bliss (1988) calls \overhead cost," as well as
costs associated with agency and logistics.15 We assume that the coordination cost increases
with the number of stores in the chain and with the number of product lines the chain
carries, that is, @d
@n > 0, @d
@k > 0. In general, the cross-partial derivative,
@2d(n;k)
@k@n , can be
positive, negative or zero. If
@2d(n;k)
@k@n < 0, increasing the number of product lines (stores)
reduces the added cost of adding a store (product line). That is, there is a positive spillover
between adding lines and stores in terms of coordination. If
@2d(n;k)
@k@n > 0, adding product
lines (stores) has a negative spillover on adding stores (product lines). We are agnostic on
whether any such spillovers exist and, if they exist, whether they are negative or positive.
Our results require, however, that any negative spillovers in the coordination of lines and
chains not be too big, at least for the relevant ranges of n and k. In other words, we assume
that
@2d(n;k)





@n2 . The parameter  indexes the rm's technology; the
larger the value of , the more advanced the rm's technology with respect to inventory
management, logistics, and distribution, and the lower is the cost of adding additional stores
and/or product lines.
15For a discussion of agency costs see Lafontaine (1992).
16Convexity of d(;) would be consistent with the ndings of Kosov a and Lafontaine (2010) for franchised
chains. There is a consensus in the marketing literature that adding product lines is associated with increased
costs; see, for example, Dukes, Geylani, and Srinivasan (2009).
21We analyze the superstore's optimal choice of its scale (number of stores) and scope
(number of product lines) using backward-induction in a three-stage process. In the rst
stage the superstore selects the number of stores it operates and the number of lines it sells.
In the second stage the superstore and all mom-and-pop stores simultaneously set prices.
Finally, consumers in each location observe their shopping choices and all prices and make
their purchases. We use a Nash solution for the simultaneous price game and monotone
methods to demonstrate that the chain's scope and scale are complements. The timing is
summarized in Figure 4.
4.2 Consumers
Consumers take the presence of a superstore, the lines it sells, and all stores' prices as given
when they decide where to shop. The consumer's problem is to minimize the total cost
(inclusive of transportation cost, , and aversion cost, ) of buying all N goods. Consumers
shop at superstores to save on transportation and other transaction costs inherent in shop-
ping in multiple stores (see, e.g., Bonn e, 2004; Gogoi, 2008). Wal-Mart, for example, touts
the convenience of one-stop shopping in its annual reports: \That's why customers choose
our Supercenters" (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1994, p. 7). Consumers agree: answering an
open-ended question soliciting the \best thing about Wal-Mart," 22 percent named broad
selection/variety (Pew, 2005).17
Let the price of item i at the mom-and-pop store and at the superstore be pi
m and pi
s,
respectively. The price of any good a consumer buys from the superstore must satisfy pi
s 
pi
m+, and we assume this condition holds for all goods the superstore sells. (An equilibrium
that satises this condition is guaranteed below.) Given this condition, a consumer who
17We view malls as an imperfect substitute for superstores because, although consumers drive to one
location and park there, they engage in many separate transactions. Consistent with the idea that shopping
at a superstore saves time relative to the alternatives, Carden and Courtemanche (2009) nd that Wal-Mart's
presence may increase consumption of \cultural" activities such as attending classical music concerts and
visiting art galleries.








A consumer chooses to shop at the superstore over purchasing all N lines at mom-and-
pop stores if and only if











which denes a threshold aversion value:





m   Ps: (4)
Consumers with superstore aversion    shop at the superstore, whereas consumers with
 >  \boycott" it. The superstore has some shoppers as long as  > 0, that is, as long as






and the measure of consumers who shop at the superstore is given by
F() = 1   exp( ):
This measure depends, through , on the price and size of the superstore's bundle, prices at
the mom-and-pop stores, and (for n > 1) on consumers' transportation cost per store.
4.3 Price Game
In the second stage, all N mom-and-pop stores in each location and the superstore simul-
taneously set prices, taking as given the superstore's rst-stage choices of n and k, and
anticipating consumers' reaction to their choices.
23As noted earlier, we start by assuming that pi
s  pi
m +  for all lines and that  > 0,
which guarantees positive demand at both mom-and-pop stores and the superstore. Later, we
verify that these conditions are satised in equilibrium. Demand for each of the superstore's
products is xi
s = F() while each mom-and-pop store competing with the superstore has
demand xi
m = 1   F(). (We ignore mom-and-pop stores that do not compete with the
superstore.)





















Assuming an interior solution, the rst-order condition for the ith mom-and-pop store is














m + 1: (6)
In other words, the dominant strategy for mom-and-pop stores that compete directly with
a superstore calls for pricing at ci
m + 1. The mom-and-pop stores' xed markup of 1 over
marginal cost is a feature of the exponential distribution of big-box aversion (1 is the value
of the exponential distribution function's rate parameter) and guarantees the chain's second-
stage prot is uniquely identied for each rst-stage choice of n and k. In a more general case
the mom-and-pop stores' best-response functions would depend not only on the superstore's
prices but also on other mom-and-pop stores' prices, in which case multiple equilibria are
possible.
At the same time, the superstore chooses its vector of prices to maximize prot at a
representative store, taking all mom-and-pop stores' prices (and its own prior choices of
24scale and scope) as given. From the consumer's problem we know that as long as the
superstore's individual prices satisfy conditions for an interior solution, only the price of the
bundle, P, aects demand. Using the inverse demand function P = P(x), we can simplify
the superstore's optimization problem to:
max













= ln(1   x







1   x   nw
0(kx
) = 0: (8)
Equation (8) implicitly denes the superstore's best response bundle price, P(x) by way of
quantity x = x(p1
m;:::;pn
m;;n;k).
Lemma 1 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium). An interior Nash Equilibrium of the second-
stage price game exists and is generically unique.
All proofs are in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 establishes that there is a bundle price P  = P(x), which maximizes the
superstore's prot and satises  > 0 and pi
s  pi
m +  for all i  n. The Nash equilibrium
of this game uniquely identies the superstore's second-stage prot, , for given rst-stage
choices n and k.
The properties of the Nash equilibrium are summarized in Figure 5 depicting the two
best-response functions. The mom-and-pop price, pi
m, is on the x axis, and the quantity
sold by the superstore is on the y axis. An increase in the number of stores operated by
the chain, k, increases its volume of sales and thereby reduces marginal cost for each item
sold by the superstore, drawing more shoppers to it. An increase in the number of products
sold, n, also draws more shoppers because of the one-stop-shopping eect.
25This result guarantees that in the second stage each superstore has positive producer
surplus. The chain sets n and k in the rst stage, balancing the marginal benet of each |
higher operating prots | against the marginal cost associated with the increased complexity
of its logistics, distribution, and management problem.
4.4 Superstore's Scale and Scope
In the rst stage the superstore chooses the number of product lines it sells, n, and the
number of stores it operates, k. We assume that this decision is simultaneous, but the
solution is identical if the choice is sequential (in either order). To conserve on notation,
from here on we assume that costs for all N goods are symmetric. The rst-stage prot
function is




where x(n;k;cm;) is the second-stage Nash equilibrium quantity of a line sold by the
superstore. Our main result, stated formally below, is that when the superstore's technology
is suciently advanced, the superstore's scale and scope are complements. To state more
precisely what we mean by suciently advanced technology, dene
 
R
x(1;1)  ( + cm + 1)   w(x(1;1))
; (9)
where R is the upper bound on
@2d(n;k)
@n@k .
Result 1 (Supermodularity). (n;k;cm;;) is supermodular in (n;k; cm;;) on the do-
main  > (R;cm;).
To understand the mechanism behind this result, consider one condition for the super-
modularity of the rm's prot function, that the cross-partial derivative of prot with respect


























The rst three terms contribute to this cross-partial being positively valued. The rst term,
@
s
@n , captures part of the one-stop-shopping eect. When a rm increases its product oer-
ings, the associated producer surplus increase derives from the bigger bundle now sold to
existing superstore shoppers. The second term, kx(
w(kx)
kx  w0(kx)), is positive because of






is an interaction between the one-stop-shopping eect (@x
@n > 0) and economies of scale in
the superstore's variable cost (w00(kx) < 0).
One-stop shopping and economies of scale and the interaction between them contribute
to the supermodularity of the superstore's prot function and thus the complementarity
between n and k. As the chain adds more stores, its sales volume increases for each product,
reducing marginal cost and increasing the total surplus it earns from its sales. This higher
surplus induces the chain to add more products. Conversely, as the chain adds more products
the one-stop-shopping eect shifts out demand at each of its stores, so the surplus earned at








, is positive if
@2d(n;k)
@n@k < 0, working to amplify the other
three eects. When
@2d(n;k)
@n@k > 0, this term operates to dampen the complementarity between
scale and scope. A sucient condition for a positive net eect is that  > , in which case
the superstore's cost of selling a new product in a new location is lower than the cost to the
consumer of acquiring the item from a mom-and-pop store, resulting in a surplus that the
superstore can capture by adding another product line to one of its stores.
This result accords with anecdotal evidence about rm expansion strategies. Industry
reports indicate, for example, that Wal-Mart's primary motivation for introducing the \Su-
percenter" format, which added a full line of groceries to the existing stores, was to increase
27store trac (Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg, 2006).
Our contribution in this model is the highlighting of the complementarity between the
scope of a retailer's operation, which provides one-stop-shopping opportunities to consumers,
and its scale. Technology alone is not enough to explain the disproportionate growth of
general-merchandise chains; as technology improves, complementarity of lines and stores
means that the eects on these two dimensions are amplied. This eect can be seen
most clearly in the higher level and disproportionate increase in chain size among general-
merchandise chains as compared with other retail chains in Figure 2(a), and in the level and
increase in store size and store-level revenue documented in Figure 2(b) and in the discussion
in Section 2, despite having access to the same general retail technology.
5 Extensions
5.1 Endogenizing the Chain's Technology
So far, we have treated the retailer's technology as exogenous, which may be justied in a
model in which rms get exogenous technology draws,  a la Jovanovic (1982). Alternatively,
Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber (1997) model retail rms that endogenously make investments
in cost-reducing technology, in which the equilibrium is characterized by mixed strategies.
The investment level of any given rm may, in that case, be taken as a random draw from
the mixed strategy space.
Result 1 continues to hold if the chain chooses its technology level, , either prior to or
concurrent with choosing its scale and scope, trading o the benets of better technology
| namely, lower logistics and distribution costs | against the cost of adopting expensive
technologies. Treating technology as endogenous implies that retailers in dierent subsec-
tors display dierent levels of technology investment, corresponding to their benets from
technology adoption. (This idea is similar to the idea of \directed technical change" in
recent models of endogenous technological change; see Acemoglu 2002.) The bigger is the
28rm's network of stores and suppliers, the greater is its incentive to invest in technology that
reduces the cost of operating this network.
Consistent with this broader interpretation of technology, our empirical results show a
stronger relationship between store count and line count for the largest general-merchandise
rms (Table 5), which have had the most reason to make larger investments in technology.
More generally, the general-merchandise subsector has been a leader in technological innova-
tion. Evidence on technology adoption rates by retail subsector is limited, but the existing
evidence points strongly to general merchandisers as leaders in this regard as well. Using
data for 1992, Doms, Jarmin, and Klimek (2004) nd that general merchandisers invest more
in technology than other retailers. Evidence from the Census of Retail Trade also conrms
that labor productivity growth in general merchandising has far outpaced the rest of the
retail sector (Basker, 2007).
Bar-code scanners are among the biggest technological innovations aecting the retail
industry in the last half century. The original motivation for this technological innovation,
rst implemented in the mid-1970s, was reducing cashier errors and increasing check-out
speed (Levin, Levin, and Meisel, 1987; Das, Falaris, and Mulligan, 2009; Basker, 2011). In the
early 1980s, mass merchandisers began to realize the full inventory-management potential of
scanners, and started requiring suppliers to print bar codes on products; grocery stores soon
followed their lead (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil, 1999). Kmart and Wal-Mart,
in particular, are widely credited with implementing the adoption of bar codes beyond the
grocery product line (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil, 1999; Dunlop and Rivkin,
1997); Holmes (2001) uses this observation to motivate his theoretical treatment of the eect
of barcode technology on product breadth.18 These general merchandisers had a strong
interest in streamlining their inventory systems, which carried at the time as many as 10,000
18Interestingly, Beck, Grajek, and Wey (2011), who study the international diusion of scanning technol-
ogy, nd that bar-code scanners diused more slowly in countries with \hypermarket" (superstore) presence,
possibly because potential adopters of the technology outside general merchandise experienced higher exit
rates in response to hypermarket competition.
29stock-keeping units (SKUs), compared to approximately 100,000 at a supermarket (Harmon
and Adams, 1984). Today, general merchandisers are leading the push to implement the
newest inventory-management innovation, radio-frequency identication tags.
Dierential rates of technology adoption are one reason for the increasing size disparity
between general merchandisers and other retailers. Larger (and expanding) chains through-
out the retail sector are known to be more ecient than retailers operating a single store
(Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2006). Specically, larger chains were early adopters of
bar-code scanners in the 1970s and early '80s (Levin, Levin, and Meisel, 1987), and more
recently they have been leaders in the implementation and use of transactional web sites,
internet procurement, and data warehousing (Hunter, 2003).
Although the Census does not ask specic questions about technology adoption in the
CRT, the broader Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES), which has been conducted by
the Census every year since 1994, asks approximately 60,000 rms their levels of equipment
investment. While all rms may be included in the survey, rms with at least 500 employ-
ees are included in the sample with certainty, and ACES industry category codes identify
rms whose primary activity is general-merchandise retailing. In 1998, 2003, and 2008,
the forms split equipment expenditures into many detailed categories, including computers
and peripheral equipment, other information and communication technology equipment, and
capitalized software (including internally developed software). A supplement to ACES has
captured non-capitalized hardware and software purchases since 2003. In future work, these
data could provide a portal into the technology-investment decisions of large retailers.
5.2 Specialist Chains
In reality, of course, not all chains are \superstores," although, as documented in Figure 2(a),
the average retailer outside general merchandising operates at a substantially lower scale.
We do not pretend to have a complete model of retailing, but in the context of our model it
30is easy to see how a chain constrained to carry a single product (n  1) will also choose to
operate fewer stores.
Although the distinction between general merchandisers and specialists in our data is
based on industrial classication, as explained in Section 2, and is therefore somewhat arbi-
trary, it does a good job of describing stores in the specialist classications. Evidence that
stores' industrial classication is a good descriptor of their type of business is provided by
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Krizan (2010), who nd that large specialist chains have a nega-
tive impact on only those single-unit retailers and smaller chain stores that are classied in
the same detailed subsector. Further evidence comes from the close match between a store's
primary product and its industrial classication. In the 2007 CRT, for example, 68% of food
and beverage stores' (NAICS 445) revenue came from food sales; 72% of book stores' (NAICS
451211) revenue came from book sales; and 88% of shoe stores' (NAICS 4482) revenue came
from shoes.
The concentration of sales in a store's primary product was even higher historically. In
the 1977 CRT, 86% of food stores' (SIC 54) revenue came from the sale of groceries; 85%
of book stores' (SIC 5942) revenue came from book sales; and 95% of shoe stores' (SIC
566) revenue came from shoe sales. The fact that specialist stores have diversied their
product sales suggests that although general merchandising is the natural place to look for
one-stop-shopping eects, specialist retail chains are also trying to exploit this margin.
A thorough study of the de-specialization of specialists is beyond the scope of our paper,
but we speculate that it is driven, at least in part, by a desire to exploit the same comple-
mentarities we study here in the context of general merchandisers. Anecdotally, Supermarket
News reported in April 2009 that the toy seller Toys \ R " Us was experimenting with a new
format selling \beverages, snacks, cereals, confectionery and household products" (Super-
market News, 2009). Toys \ R " Us had previously started combining its toy stores and baby
stores (Babies \ R " Us) under one roof (Rosenbloom, 2009). The coee chain Starbucks mar-
kets music CDs; the New York Times reported in 2004 that Starbucks accounted for more
31than a quarter of the sales of a Ray Charles album that had just gone platinum (Levine,
2004). These chains are not alone. The 2007 CRT reports that over 12% of grocery stores
sell toys, hobby goods, and games; 8% of building-materials stores sell groceries; and some
enterprising fruit and vegetable markets sell jewelry. As specialist chains branch out into
additional products, increasing their scope, we expect them to increase their scale as well.
5.3 Population Growth
Population growth in each location, holding the distribution of preferences constant, increases
the measure of consumers who shop at the superstore in proportion to population growth
and with it, the protability of each of the chain's product lines in each of its stores, leading
to an increase in both scale (k) and scope (n) (and technology, if its level is endogenous).
In a dierent context, Campbell and Hubbard (2009) show that the size of gasoline stations
increased in anticipation of increased trac in the early years of the Interstate Highway
System.
Empirically, the Census data we developed for this paper could be used to study whether
retail chains with a disproportionate number of stores in growing areas add lines and stores
faster than chains located in stagnant areas. However, we caution against interpreting any
results causally, because chains locating in growing areas may be dierent in other unobserved
ways from chains located in stagnant areas.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we document empirically the simultaneous in-
crease in product breadth and chain size for general-merchandise retailers. We argue that
these trends cannot be due to technology alone, because we see much weaker trends in other
retail subsectors that have access to the same technology, such as the grocery subsector. We
use micro data from the Census of Retail Trade to show that general merchandisers add simi-
32lar lines throughout their chains when their store count increases, both in the case of mergers
and acquisitions and in the case of new store construction. Second, we oer an explanation
for these facts that relies on an interaction of economies of scale and demand-driven gains
from scope due to consumer preference for one-stop shopping. This one-stop-shopping eect
is present for other retail forms, but is strongest in general merchandising. Technological
innovations, such as the introduction of Radio Frequency Identication technology in the
distribution process, or cost reductions due to trade liberalization, increase both a chain's
optimal scale and its optimal scope, but the interaction between the two is what sets general
merchandisers apart. The interaction between the demand side and the cost side of the
retailer's optimization problem amplies the eect of any one of these forces on both scale
and scope.
As large general-merchandise chains add more lines, and more stores, they compete more
vigorously with small businesses in an increasing number of product lines and locations. Our
model implies that much of the increased competitive pressure on small retailers is due to
the fact that growing chains face decreasing marginal cost curves. In addition, new product
lines increase the one-stop-shopping benets at the superstore, with negative eects on mom-
and-pop stores: a consumer who now goes to the superstore to buy groceries also buys shoes
and sporting goods, reducing demand at the mom-and-pop shoe and sporting-goods stores
in town. The welfare eects of these changes can be substantial. Many of the empirical
studies on the competitive impact of \big-box" stores cited in Sections 2 and 3 analyze the
eect of a single general merchandiser, in some cases studying the impact of a single product
line sold by a single general merchandiser. The eect aggregated over many products and
locations is obviously even larger.
Other welfare implications of technological innovations and chains' resulting expansion
and consolidation are more complex due to the presence of externalities. In our model,
the chain's growth has only positive eects on consumers. Because a consumer choosing
whether or not to shop at the superstore compares the private cost of doing so (aversion cost)
33to her private benet (lower transportation costs and prices) and ignores the externality
she creates by increasing the store's sales volume (lower marginal cost of goods, which
leads to lower prices on existing goods and induces the chain to add stores and products,
beneting consumers in the same location as well as across locations), fewer consumers shop
at the superstore than is socially optimal. This result, however, depends critically on the
assumptions we have made on the cost structure of mom-and-pop stores; specically, the
constant marginal cost and lack of xed costs. If marginal cost for all stores were decreasing,
consumers switching from shopping at mom-and-pop stores to shopping at the superstore
would impose negative externalities on other mom-and-pop shoppers, osetting positive
externalities on superstore shoppers. Alternatively, if mom-and-pop stores had xed costs,
then they would exit when their patronage dropped below some threshold level. In that case,
while most switching consumers would be inframarginal and impose no negative externalities,
the marginal consumer whose switching leads a store to shut down would impose potentially
large negative externalities on its remaining would-be shoppers (in the spirit of Waldfogel,
2008). The net eect in these cases is theoretically ambiguous.
Unlike other studies of the retail sector, our analysis is not restricted to a small subset
of retailers whose product composition is known and we do not have to guess at what stores
actually sell. Using rich product-level sales data from the Census of Retail Trade micro
les, we know what products stores sell, how much revenue each store generates from each
product category, and how this varies both across stores in a single chain and at a single store
over time. With these data, we document the simultaneous growth of general-merchandise
chains and the expansion of the superstore format over a thirty-year period. This eect is
particularly strong for large chains, consistent with their dramatic growth over these three
decades.
34A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The superstore's best response function x(p1
m;:::;pn
m) is dened by the
rst order condition x(x; p1
m;:::;pn
m) = 0.
First we show that x(p1
m;:::;pn
m) is dened for all n  1, k  1. By inspection of
Equation (8), we see that for all n  1, k  1:
 x() is continuous, dierentiable over x 2 (0;1);
 x(0) = 0+(n 1) +
Pn
i=1 pi
m 0 nw0(0). We assume w0(0) < ci
m for all i. Therefore
x(0) > 0 when pi
m = ci
m + 1 and by continuity of x(), x(0) > 0 for some values of
pi
m < ci
m + 1 as well;
 limx!1 x(x) =  1.
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists an x 2 (0;1) such that x(x) = 0.
Furthermore, xx(x) < 0 is the second-order condition for the superstore's optimization
problem which is satised by the assumption that marginal cost is atter than marginal
revenue at x.
Although there may be multiple local optima satisfying both the rst- and second-
order conditions, generically one of them must dominate globally. This guarantees that the
superstore's best response, x(p1
m;:::;pn
m), is generically single-valued (although it need not
be continuous). Therefore, the Nash equilibrium exists and is dened by pi
m = ci




The fact that x > 0 guarantees that  > 0, which was one of our starting assumptions.
It also guarantees that P  <
Pn
i=1 pi
m+(n 1), which means that there exists a continuum
of price vectors fp1;:::;png satisfying pi
s  pi
m +  8i. Moreover, second-stage prot per







 (kx( + p
n
m)   w(kx)) > 0;
35so the superstore cannot be optimizing if it prices some products above this threshold.
The superstore's best-response function, x = x(p1
m;:::;pn
m;;a;n;k), has the following
properties:
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Proof of Result 1. Supermodularity requires that  has increasing dierences in (n;k; cm;;),








@n@cm, are all non-negative.

















Using the inverse demand function for the chain, we calculate the cross partials for the














Before we write out the expressions for the second cross-partial derivatives, it is useful
19We are implicitly assuming that all ci
m's are increasing together.
36to note that the expressions are evaluated at the second-stage Nash prices which means that
x  0 and dx
































Finally, we show that @2
@n@k > 0. Applying the envelope theorem to the second-stage
































































































The second term is positive by the concavity of w (average cost strictly exceeds marginal
cost for kx > 0). The third term is negative since w00 < 0 (again by concavity of w) and
@x
@n = pn
m+ w0(kx) > 0, as shown earlier. Therefore a sucient condition for Equation (12)




















This term is everywhere positive, and is minimized when n = k = 1 because x is increasing
in n, and average cost,
w(kx)
kx , is decreasing, so a sucient condition is that Equation (13)
holds at n = k = 1. This is guaranteed by the domain restriction  > (R;cm;).
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Figure 1. All Chains' and Large Chains' Share of Revenues
Large chains are dened as chains with 100 or more stores





















































































































(b) Average Revenue per Store in Millions of 2007 Dollars
Figure 2. Chain and Store Growth over Time
































Figure 3. Share of General-Merchandise Establishments Selling Selected Products
Source: Published data from Census of Retail Trade
Figure 4. Timing of Model
45(a) An increase in the number of product lines, n, number of stores, k, or trans-
portation cost, .
(b) An increase in the mom-and-pop marginal cost, ci
m.
Figure 5. Comparative Statics of the Second-Stage Nash Equilibrium
46Table 1. General-Merchandise Subsector vs. Rest of Retail Sector, 2007
General Rest of GM/All
Merchandisinga Retailb Retail
Retail Firms (000) 9 707 0.012
Stores (000) 46 1,082 0.041
Revenue (000,000,000$) 577 3,341 0.147
Fraction of Stores in Chains 0.81 0.39 1.982
Fraction of Stores in Large Chainsc 0.77 0.24 2.893
Source: Published data from Census of Retail Trade, 2007
a NAICS 452
b NAICS 44{45, excluding 452
c Large chains have 100 or more stores
Table 2. The General-Merchandise Subsector over Time
All Single Small Large Total
Year Firms Stores Chains Chainsa Revenuesb
1977 16,098 14,897 1,166 35 320,776,187
1982 13,344 12,386 918 40 256,353,360
1987 12,917 12,093 786 38 330,628,856
1992 10,264 9,660 565 39 362,559,869
1997 10,373 9,933 398 42 426,884,830
2002 9,467 9,150 285 32 513,139,738
2007 8,925 8,616 281 28 577,098,195
Source: Published data from Census of Retail Trade,
1977{2007
a Large chains have 100 or more stores (101+ in 1977)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































51Table B-1. Product Lines
Number of
Broad Line Description Years Detailed Linesa
Groceries All 9
Meals, Snacks, and Nonalcoholic Beverages for Immediate Consumption All 1
Meals, Snacks, and Beverages for Catered Events 2007 1
Packaged Liquor, Wine, and Beer All 1
Tobacco Products and Accessories All 1
Drugs and Health and Beauty Aids All 6
Soaps, Detergents, and Household Cleaners 1987{2007 1
Paper and Related Products 1987{2007 1
Men's Apparel All 11
Women's Apparel All 13
Children's Apparel All 4
Footwear All 5
Curtains, Draperies, and Domestics All 2
Major Household Appliances All 3
Small Electrical Appliances All 1
Televisions, VCRs, and Videotapes All 2
Audio Equipment and Music All 3
Furniture All 4
Floor Coverings All 3
Computer Hardware and Software All 2
Kitchenware and Home Furnishings All 4
Jewelry All 2
Optical Goods (Including Eyeglasses, and Telescopes) All 1
Sporting Goods (Including Bicycles and Guns) All 7
Hardware, Tools, Plumbing, and Electrical Equipment and Accessories All 1
Lawn and Garden Equipment and Supplies All 4
Building Materials, Paint, and Home Improvement Equipment and Supplies All 1
Automotive Supplies All 3
Automotive Fuels All 1
Household Fuels All 1
Pets, Pet Foods, and Pet Supplies 1987{2007 1
Photographic Equipment and Supplies All 1
Toys (Including Games and Crafts) All 2
Sewing, Knitting, and Needlework Goods All 1
Stationary, School, and Oce Supplies All 2
Luggage and Leather Goods All 1
Oce Equipment 1987{2007 2
Souvenirs and Novelty Items, Including Seasonal Decorations 1997{2007 2
Books, Magazines, and Newspapers All 2
Miscellaneous Merchandise, Not Elsewhere Classied All 3
Non-merchandise Receipts All 8
aMaximum number. Depending on the year, there are up to 41 broad lines and up to 124 detailed lines.
52